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Large incidents are a combination of different factors. Any of those factors on their own would 
not have produced the incident, but together can be catastrophic. This unfortunate alignment is the 
nature of all disasters. Understanding how each piece came together to produce that incident 
provides important insight for reducing risk and preventing future incidents from occurring. Some 
organizations within the energy, aviation and healthcare industries cite James Reason’s Swiss 
cheese model of accident causation to explain this confluence of events. The holes in each slice 
align just right for the incident to occur. Moving just one of the slices can prevent a negative 
outcome. If more than one slice is misaligned, the risk can be made even lower. This is also known 
as defense in depth and layers of protection—approaches used across high-risk industries. 
 
The straight-line slices of cheese overlook the important interconnections within complex issues. 
An incident consists of multiple cause-and-effect relationships that all come together in a particular 
way. Digging into these causes provides opportunities to misalign an incident, reducing the risk of 
the system in the future. Highly reliable organizations dissect their operations to pinpoint where 
simple verifications and checks can make the likelihood of an incident significantly lower. 
 
This presentation uses a few historical disasters, including the 2005 Texas City refinery explosion, 
to explain how a complex incident can be analyzed starting with just a few basic cause-and-effect 
relationships. That simple analysis can then be expanded into a much more detailed explanation 
revealing how simple miscommunications like shift change, were causally related to the disaster. 
Changing one item would have changed that incident. Improving the way people communicate 
details within an incident improves the way they mitigate risk and prevent incidents going forward. 
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The way problems are explained affects the way they’re solved. An accurate and thorough 
representation of an issue is essential for understanding the different ways risk can be reduced. 
There can be disconnects in the way people discuss problems depending on the tool or model 
people use. These miscommunications can distort the analysis and obscure the solutions. Avoiding 
communication roadblocks doesn’t require adding another tool, but rather going back to the 
basics—a first principles approach. 
 
 
2 Right-Answer Versus System Problems 
 
From our earliest school years, we learn that solving problems is about finding the right answer. 
Twelve or more years in school focused on providing the right answer on homework, tests and 
college entrance exams has an effect—it creates a bias for the one, right answer. That right-answer 
approach from school becomes our default model for all problems. It reinforces the idea that there 
is a silver bullet, cure-all, panacea or root cause to solve whatever the problem might be. 
 
But there are two fundamentally different types of problems with your operation. There are right-
answer problems that have one answer and there are system problems that have a range of different 
solutions. Many of the daily problems people encounter in their jobs have one right answer. In 
these cases, the right-answer approach works well. How many people were on the crew? What’s 
the volume of the tank? What’s the flash point of that product? What is the planned start date? 
Which valves need to be closed to isolate this system? All these questions have a one right answer. 
System problems, on the other hand, don’t have a right-answer. A system problems naturally break 
down into parts. Because they’re multifaceted there is a range of solutions. Different people 
working on the same problem can propose completely different ways to solve it. Solutions to a 
system problem vary by complexity as well as effectiveness. Some solutions are better than others. 
There are also trade-offs and constraints. Sometimes a high risk, potentially catastrophic problem 
can have a solution that is simple, yet extremely effective. 
 
Just as risk and reliability are probabilistic, system problems are too. The concepts of a cumulative 
reduction in risk, layers of protection and defense in depth are based on the degree to which the 
probability and consequence can be lowered. Like the concept of six-sigma, preventing a system 
problem is also a matter of degree. There’s not one right answer. Safety within a company, whether 
it’s for personnel or process, strives for zero incidents by making the risk extremely low. 
Operations and equipment issues are system problems—as are all issues related to human 
performance and human error. Improving training and procedures to prevent errors also has a 
spectrum of solutions, instead of a right answer. 
 
Distinguishing between right-answer and system problems is important because the approach and 
language for solving them is different. Right-answer problems have one right answer. The words 
right and wrong apply. This question, “What is 3 x 5?,” has one answer: 15. Someone may believe 
it’s 18, but their answer is wrong. It’s appropriate discuss these types of problems in terms of right 
and wrong. 
 
Questions like, “Why did the equipment fail?,” “Why did the tank overfill?,” and “Why did that 
injury occur?” require some digging. There is not one answer to those questions. The explanation 
of why something happened naturally uncovers more and more questions. The same question may 
be answered differently by different people. Each person may explain a different part of the overall 
problem since they see the incident from their different points of view. Engineering, operations 
and maintenance don’t see problems the same way, but that doesn’t mean there’s necessarily a 
conflict either. With a system problem, different people can provide different answers to the same 
question, yet both can be telling the truth. This point is demonstrated in the case studies in this 
paper (see Section 6). 
 
 
3 How the Search for the Root Cause Distorts Problems 
 
One of the most common mistakes people make when investigating a problem is trying to apply 
right-answer thinking to a system problem. This right-answer bias leads people to mistakenly 
attribute an incident to a special cause, commonly referred to as the “root cause.” A root cause is 
usually defined as the one factor that if removed would have prevented the incident from occurring. 
This model assumes that some causes are more important than other causes. The less important 
causes, those that cannot produce the issue on their own, are known as contributing factors. In this 
model, the identification of the root cause is key to eliminating the problem. 
 
This mental model is appealing to those who think in terms of right-answer, but it is evidence of 
how people are biased to their own points of view. People select and emphasize the information 
that supports their agenda and ignore what doesn’t. For an incident to have occurred, every cause 
of that incident had to happen. The fire triangle is one example of this. Changing any one of the 
causes changes the incident. Those who believe a root cause is a special type of cause, use the 
same argument: if the root cause wouldn’t have occurred the incident never would have happened. 
This point may be true. But right-answer thinkers fail to recognize that same point applies to all 
the other causes of the incident in the same way. When a right-answer thinker tests one of the 
causes, they can mistakenly conclude that they’re right without testing other causes. Their 
argument for that cause is accurate, valid and true, but it is not “right.” It’s not the cause. It’s one 
of the causes. This is a known as confirmation bias. People test their root cause to confirm they’re 
correct. If they tested their argument on any of the other causes, they would notice each of those 
causes satisfies the same argument. This is confirmation bias because people only test their 
preferred cause to confirm they are correct. It reflects how strong right-answer bias can be.  
 
These are perceived less important causes are typically labelled as contributing causes or 
secondary causes and may not even be considered for solutions. By differentiating causes 
organizations can be missing opportunities to find better solutions. Focusing only on root causes 
artificially restricts the analysis, thereby limiting the set of available solutions. Ideas and insights 
from others can inadvertently be stifled if the group is mandated to focus only on the important 
causes – the root causes. Another unfortunate characteristic of root cause logic is it inadvertently 
aligns with a blame mentality.  By looking for just one cause, blamers want to know the person or 
group who caused the problem. They don’t want to look at the system. Blamers want to know the 
person or group responsible. The right-answer model of root cause analysis often mistakenly 
reinforces the language of blame. 
 
Understanding that the root is a system of causes that branch out in different causal paths, all of 
which had to occur to produce the incident, provides an accurate and thorough explanation of an 
incident. The concept of conducting a root cause analysis to identify that system is based on simple 
cause-and-effect, and so is the Swiss cheese model. 
 
 
4 How the Slices of Swiss Cheese Align 
 
The Swiss cheese model (see Figure 1) of accident causation developed by James Reason provides 
an easy way to visualize how multiple breakdowns result in a problem. The Swiss cheese model 
has become popular across industries from refining to healthcare. It provides a conceptual 
framework that a problem is consists of multiple factors that all came together and aligned in the 
right way to produce the unwanted incident. Reason uses latent and active failures. He says the 




 Figure 1 – James Reason’s Swiss cheese model  
 
Within the model, each slice of cheese is meant to represent an organizational defense. The holes 
in a slice are weaknesses where the defense can be breached. The model demonstrates that 
organizations put systems and processes in place that are designed to prevent a problem. When all 
the slices align in such a way that there’s straight line passing all the way through the negative 
event happens. All the breakdowns are required. 
 
The point is multiple items must align for the incident to happen. Meaning, if we misaligned just 
one slice the problem is avoided. Misaligning more than one slice makes the likelihood of 
occurrence even lower. This is the layers of protection logic that helps reduce risk in many 
organizations. 
 
When a problem does occur, an investigation identifies all the different slices–the systems that 
broke down. For the incident to have occurred, all the slices had to align in a particular way. In 
retrospect, it can seem incredible how everything came together the way it did. But they had to 
come together in that specific way, or the incident wouldn’t have happened. 
 
What people sometimes don’t realize about their organization is that multiple slices are aligning 
every day. Every day 2 of 5, 3 of 5 or 4 of 5 slices are lining up, but because they don’t all align, 
there hasn’t been a major problem. Everything within the company’s operations look fine because 
there are not big problems, but there are several little problems occurring. These little problems 
may be considered minor because they have low consequences. But in reality, these low 
consequence items are essential pieces of the large problems that haven’t happened yet. Improving 
the way an organization works the seemingly small, low consequence items lowers the risk of 
larger incidents. Concerns like, “Why are we even spending time on this issue, nothing happened,” 
may happen. We’re spending time on it because there’s an inherent value of prevention. 
 
This point of misaligning one slice isn’t a unique insight, it’s simply the nature of cause-and-effect. 
It is the same lesson for root cause analysis logic. All the causes must happen for the incident to 
occur. Changing or misaligning any one of the slices changes the issue. The lesson from the Swiss 
cheese model is a lesson in basic cause-and-effect. 
 
Because the individual slices of Swiss cheese are always shown in a straight line, it leads people 
to believe that the breakdowns are linear. Because the model is linear people often conclude the 
incident is linear. Incidents, also known as a system problems, are nonlinear. The incident is 
nonlinear, but the cause-and-effect relationships between the different breakdowns (slices) can be 
linear or nonlinear. The Swiss cheese model provides no information about the cause-and-effect 
relationships within the incident. Conceptually, the lesson of misalignment within the Swiss 
Cheese model is valuable and it works well to introduce the idea. But the Swiss cheese model 
ignores important cause-and-effect relationships within the incident that are essential for revealing 
different options to lower risk. A problem analysis starts linearly, but it expands to be nonlinear in 
order to provide a complete explanation of what happened. 
 
Rather than considering the slices of Swiss cheese to be inadequate defences, they can simply be 
thought of as causes. This provides a more thorough explanation because it includes what Reason 
called “conditions.” He differentiated between causes and conditions in his explanation of the 
Swiss cheese. The distinction between types of factors that produce an issue is not necessary. The 
active and latent factors are causes. One isn’t more causally related to an incident than the other. 
The latent failures occur along the same causal path as active, but farther upstream. For example, 
how the equipment was designed occurred before how it was operated. One is not more or less 
important than the other because both are required for the incident to occur. The valuable insights 
people share using the Swiss cheese model regarding breakdowns and alignment are simply 
lessons of cause-and-effect.  
 
 
5 Simple Cause and Effect  
 
Cause-and-effect is not a problem-solving technique, it’s a fundamental principle of the different 
techniques. The repeatability requirement of science is simply producing the same effects with the 
same causes regardless of who performs the experiment. There is no secret method to explaining 
how or why something occurred. Cause-and-effect is how things work on the farm, in the 
mechanic’s garage, in the refinery, in the hospital and at an airline. People who know a particular 
discipline, field or hobby well can describe the detailed cause-and-effect relationships within the 
function. Those who don’t understand a task or process can’t explain its causes and effects. To 
them, it just happens.  
 
Cause-and-effect may seem too simple for complex problems. But it only seems simple because 
it’s fundamental. Cause-and-effect applies equally to small, large, simple and complex problems 
in safety, operations, equipment and human performance. It’s works the same for explaining why 
something went badly as it does for explaining why something went well. It doesn’t change from 
incident to incident. The case studies below show how the analysis of a problem can begin 
basically, then expand as necessary. Cause-and-effect thinking is the critical thinking and 
troubleshooting skills that so many organizations aspire to develop among their team members. 
 
Each of the case studies in this paper show how a bias for a right answer can inadvertently confuse 
the way people explain a problem. But these miscommunications have no bearing on the incident. 
They don’t change the incident in any way. If an investigation remains focused on identifying 
cause-and-effect relationships supported with evidence, a complete explanation of the incident will 
emerge. The cause-and-effect analyses in these examples begin as simple linear 3-to 5-Whys. They 
then expand into as much detail as needed to thoroughly explain the issue. By taking a first 
principles approach, people’s biases will be flushed out to provide a clear, accurate and thorough 
explanation of the issue. 
 
6 Texas City Refinery Explosion 2005 
 
On March 23, 2005, a massive explosion at the Texas City, Texas, refinery 40 miles southeast of 
Houston resulted in a catastrophic disaster with 15 fatalities and more than 180 injuries. A simple 
summary of the incident is that too much liquid was added to a tower resulting in a release to 
atmosphere that ignited. 
 
The incident can be explained many ways. Some of the different points of view of why the disaster 
happened are: 
 
 The level instrument on the tower displayed the wrong level. The instrument indicated a lower 
level of 9 feet and dropping. The 165-feet-tall tower should not have been filled above 10 feet. 
The liquid level in the tower ultimately reached 158 feet without operations realizing it. 
(Instrument) 
 
 The valve on the bottom of the tower was in the closed position. The standard operating 
procedure (SOP) for startup of that system states that the bottom valve should be 50% open. 
That procedure was not followed. (Procedure) 
 
 The experience of the control room operator was inadequate. During startup of this 
isomerization unit, a qualified operator must be on the board in the control room. In cases 
where a less experienced operator is on the board, a senior technical representative must 
accompany them. Due to an unplanned family emergency, the senior technician badged out of 
the facility at 10:47 a.m. The less experienced operator on the board continued with the startup. 
(Experience) 
 
 The blowdown drum, D-20, that the overfill of the tower flowed into was vented to atmosphere. 
Once the large volume of liquid left the raffinate tower, it overwhelmed the capacity of the 
blowdown drum, which was vented out a stack instead of a flare that could have handled the 
excess flow more effectively. (Design) 
 
 There was a miscommunication on shift change that morning. One of the day supervisors 
missed the shift change meeting after the night crew had already filled the bottom of the tower 
to the required level. The plan discussed in that meeting was to not add any more liquid to the 
tower. (Miscommunication) 
 
Each one of the explanations above is accurate. But none of them are individually the right answer. 
None of them are the root cause of the issue. But all are causes. The next question to ask for each 
one of these arguments is, “Why?”  
 
The cause-and-effect relationships in the five bullets need to be diagrammed. The last word in each 
of the bullets shows how that information would typically be labeled. Organizations frequently use 
broad terms to categorize an incident. The intent is to provide a simple summary of what happened, 
but it can oversimplify and distort the issue. A thorough explanation requires an incident to be 
broken down into parts. 
 
Figure 2 a simple cause-and-effect analysis for the Texas City refinery disaster. This 1-Why is 
accurate, but it is not a complete explanation of the incident. There are many cause-and-effect 




Figure 2 – A 1-Why analysis of the Texas City refinery explosion investigation. 
 
 
Here’s a 5-Why for the first bulleted item–instrument failure (Figure 2). This cause-and-effect 




Figure 2 – An accurate, 5-Why to begin the Texas City refinery explosion investigation. 
 
But the different perspectives listed in the bullet points allow for multiple 5-Whys. See the 











Figure 3 – Different 5-Whys. Each is accurate and can be used to start the investigation. 
The 17-Why below (See Figure 4) shows how the five different linear analyses can combine into 
one more complete explanation with parallel cause-and-effect relationships. This is the nonlinear 




Figure 4 – The 17-Why shows how multiple 5-Whys can combine into one analysis. 
 
All the causes in this analysis had to occur for this incident to happen. This is analogous to the 
multi-layered breakdowns of the Swiss cheese model that all must align for the negative outcome 
to occur. Each causal path in the diagram reveals an independent, linear chain of events that results 
in the loss of life and impact to property. Reviewing a single path can make it seem as though that 
path alone caused the incident. People usually believe their particular linear explanation is the right 
one. This is the flaw in linear, right-answer, root cause thinking. All the different paths are the root 
of this incident. 
 
The Texas City disaster is shown below as a 125-Why (included in Figure 5 to show how the 
structure develops). An incident contains all its causes. The investigation can reveal a 1-Why, 5-
Why, 17-Why or more Whys. The level of detail depends on how much the organization wants to 
know about the incident. Executive summaries show one level of an investigation, but they can 
exclude important details. The intent of root cause analysis is to dig into those details to an 




Figure 5 – The structure of the expanded 125-Why Texas City refinery explosion investigation. 
 
 
Making a cause-and-effect diagram improves the way people communicate the details of what they 
know. The right-answer bias of conventional root cause analysis becomes difficult to support with 
this diagram. Verbally, root cause logic seems to make sense, but visually, its flawed logic is easier 
to see. Controlling (or misaligning) any one of the causes reduces the risk of a similar incident 
occurring. By controlling multiple causes, the risk can be reduced significantly. This basic-to-
detailed approach of cause-and-effect analysis can be applied to any issue to improve 
communication and reduce risk. 
